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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this niauei puisu.ii i m i 
CodeAnn. §78-?-?HMa)(2lMh). 
ISSUED rRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
L Whetlvi luitable defenses such as laches, estoppel and unjust enrichment can dclcat 
a legal claim to real property? 
TheCour*-^ \ppeji- M ^ i ^ ^ . > . * • \ » - ^ • '• -- 'o y. Restates 
• iising Servs., ; • •' iu/ / . iiiio i^suc wab raised L VMW [R , 
l-
1JL- Whether, assuming petitioner David J Allen is entitled to (lie subject tv .^ 
the Utah Court of Appeals correctly ruled llml polilioiiu 1 XtviJ I \II<n is -.noii&iok, 
for all indebtedness set urnl by ll^  propnlv'' 
rl lie I 'oiiii ( Appeals1 decision is reviewed for correctness. See Evan* v Hit of 
County Comm )'s\ 2005 UT 74, f 8. This issue was raiscu ix n»^  ->*
 t i ,a ;^ i . •>-. . h 
Trial, at p. 145 (a copy of the transcript is included in II ^ • • 
III. \¥ hethei ihc (lull < 'nun n» Appr.d1, t "in1* fi", mled thai petitioner David J. Allen must 
pay 1 \ n imm ovements made to the subject real property? 
The Court of Appeals" decision is reviewed for correctness. Sec Je])s i Munt^t , *'"'0 
P.2d 1234, 1240 (Utah 1 v ^ r i ih-,
 (*sue was raised belttvv | K S42]. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISION 
The following statutory provision is determinative or of central importance to this 
appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1, et seq. (a copy of this statute is attached to the Brief of 
Petitioner as Exhibit "A"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioner David J. Allen ("Allen") acquired the real property that is the subject of the 
above-captioned action (the "Property") in 1989. He divorced Sarah Satterfield Allen in 
1990, and their divorce decree awarded the Property to Ms, Satterfield subject to a right of 
reversion in Mr, Allen in the event that Ms. Satterfield moved away from Salt Lake City 
before the couple's children attained majority. 
Ms. Satterfield conveyed the Property to respondent Thomas K. Hall ("Hall") in 
January 1998. Eighteen months later, and more than four years before the youngest of her 
and Mr. Allen's children reached 18 years of age, Ms. Satterfield moved to North Carolina 
in July 1999. Mr. Allen subsequently contacted Mr. Hall, who by this time had refinanced 
the Property with a loan from Homecomings Financial Network, Inc. ("Homecomings 
Financial"), and asserted a claim to the Property. This litigation ensued. 
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II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Allen sued Hall and Homecomings Financial on May 18, 2000, seeking a quiet title 
decree and unjust enrichment damages for Hall's use of the Property. [R. 4]. Hall 
counterclaimed to quiet title to the Property in himself, and, in the event Allen was awarded 
the Property, to recover unjust enrichment damages and to recover damages pursuant to the 
Occupying Claimants Act. [R. 108-12]. Following a bench trial the trial court quieted title 
to the Property in Hall and denied Allen's prayer for unjust enrichment damages. [R. 544-
46]. Allen appealed. [R. 547-49]. 
During the pendency of Allen's appeal, Hall defaulted on his obligations to 
Homecomings Financial. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion 
for Leave to Intervene, at p. 2. Hall conveyed the Property to Homecomings Financial in lieu 
of foreclosure. Id. Intervenors Chad R. Moore and Melanie S. Moore (collectively, the 
"Moores") subsequently purchased the Property from Homecomings Financial in July 2004. 
Id. 
On January 31,2005, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its opinion reversing the trial 
court in part and affirming in part. See 2005 UT App. 23, 107 P.3d 85. The Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court's decision to quiet title to the Property in Hall. Id., f 10. 
Further, the Court of Appeals ruled that Allen was entitled to the Property subject to all debt 
secured thereby as of July 1999. Id., ^ 12. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Allen 
must reimburse Hall pursuant to the Occupying Claimants Act for the value of Hall's 
157072vl-MJB 3 
improvements to the Property. Id., ff 13-17. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the 
trial court for a determination of the amount to which Hall is entitled. Id., % 17. 
Having learned of the Moores interest in the Property, Allen petitioned the Court of 
Appeals for "review, rehearing and reconsideration." The Court of Appeals denied Allen's 
petition on March 11, 2005, and Allen petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari on or 
about April 11, 2005. The Court granted Allen's petition on August 9, 2005. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As successors to Hall and Homecomings Financial, the Moores have stepped into their 
shoes and occupy the same position with respect to this appeal as Hall and Homecomings 
Financial would had they retained an interest in the Property. 
Allen acquired the Property on or about May 15,1989. [R. 580]. He divorced Sarah 
Satterfield Allen on or about May 17,1990. [R. 530]. Their divorce decree (the "Decree") 
awarded the Property to Ms. Satterfield subject to a right of reversion in Allen in the event 
that Ms. Satterfield moved more than 50 miles away from Salt Lake City before the youngest 
of the couple's children attained majority. [R. 531], The Decree also provided that in the 
event the Property reverted to Allen, he "will then sell the home and divide the proceeds 
equally with [Ms. Satterfield], and . . . will be responsible for all indebtedness thereon until 
the house is sold." [R. 531]. 
After acquiring the Property from Allen pursuant to a quit-claim deed that was 
recorded on May 11,1994, Ms. Satterfield refinanced the Property at least seven times. [R. 
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532-34]. On at least one such occasion, Allen assisted Ms. Satterfield by executing an 
affidavit requested by a title company. [R. 534], Ms. Satterfield eventually conveyed the 
Property to Hall by quit-claim deed on January 19,1998. [R. 534]. Hall paid Ms. Satterfield 
$7,000 and assumed loans to Ms. Satterfield totaling approximately $139,000. [R. 534]. Ms. 
Satterfield told Hall that the Property was otherwise unencumbered. Id. At the time he 
purchased the Property, Hall was not aware of the possibility that the Property might revert 
to Allen in the event Ms. Satterfield moved out of Salt Lake City. See Transcript of Bench 
Trial, at p. 96. 
Approximately two days after Hall purchased the Property, Allen forcibly entered the 
Property to remove personal effects he claimed to own. [R. 535]. Hall discovered Allen on 
the Property at that time and asked why Allen was there. Id. Allen indicated his 
understanding that the Property had been sold, but said nothing to Hall about claiming a 
reversionary interest in the Property. Id. Hall proceeded to spend approximately $52,000 to 
improve the Property. Id. 
On or about June 7, 1999, Hall refinanced the Property with a loan from 
Homecomings Financial. [R. 536]. Then, on or about July 19, 1999, more than four years 
before the youngest of her and Allen's children reached 18 years of age, Ms. Satterfield 
moved to North Carolina. [R. 537]. 
Hall defaulted on his obligations to Homecomings Financial. See Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Leave to Intervene, at p. 2. In lieu of 
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foreclosure, Hall conveyed the Property to Homecomings Financial. Id. In July 2004, the 
Moores purchased the Property from Homecomings Financial. Id. A copy of the Special 
Warranty Deed by which Bank One, N.A., as trustee, conveyed the Property to the Moores 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. EQUITABLE DEFENSES MAY DEFEAT LEGAL CLAIMS AND THE COURT 
OF APPEALS' CONTRARY DECISION WAS ERRONEOUS 
The trial court found that for approximately two years Allen intentionally refrained 
from disclosing the possibility that the Property might revert to him in order to induce Hall 
to improve the Property and increase the equity therein, all to Allen's benefit. The trial court 
consequently rejected Allen's claim to the Property on the basis of "laches, estoppel and 
unjust enrichment," and awarded the Property to Hall. Apparently believing that equitable 
defenses cannot overcome legal claims, the Court of Appeals reversed and gave the Property 
to Allen. 
The Court of Appeals erred. This Court has long recognized that equitable defenses 
may be asserted against legal claims. Likewise, courts around the counlry increasingly 
permit the application of traditionally equitable defenses to actions at law. Since equitable 
defenses are not categorically insufficient to defeat legal claims, this Court should reverse 
the Court of Appeals and award the Property to the Moores as Hall's successors. 
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II. IN THE EVENT THAT ALLEN IS ENTITLED TO THE PROPERTY, HE IS 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL DEBT SECURED THEREBY AS OF THE TIME THE 
PROPERTY REVERTED TO HIM 
The Court of Appeals correctly determined that, to the extent the Property reverted to 
Allen when Ms. Satterfield moved out of Salt Lake City, Allen took title to the Property 
subject to all indebtedness secured by the Property at that time. Any other decision would 
have ignored the language of the Decree and given Allen an unjustified windfall. The 
Moores have standing to enforce the Decree as successors to both Hall and Homecomings 
Financial because the Decree evidences a clear intent on the part of Allen and Ms. Satterfield 
to provide for the repayment of debt to third-parties. 
Neither of Allen's challenges to the Court of Appeals' decision making him 
responsible for post-Decree debt withstands scrutiny. First, Allen suggests that 
Homecomings Financial lost whatever interest it had in the Property when Ms. Satterfield 
left Salt Lake City in July 1999. This argument ignores the plain language of the Decree 
which expressly made Allen "responsible for all indebtedness [secured by the Property] until 
the house is sold." Second, Allen argues that because the Decree gave Ms. Satterfield only 
a 50 percent interest in the Property, she could not encumber his 50 percent interest. In fact, 
the Decree made no such division. Rather, the Decree awarded the Property to Ms. 
Satterfield as "her sole and separate property." Only if she moved out of Salt Lake City 
before her children attained majority would Allen ever have an interest in the Property. Ms. 
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Satterfield was therefore entitled to encumber the Property to any extent, and, if the Property 
ever reverted to Allen, he became responsible for all debt secured thereby at that time. 
The Court of Appeals' decision to hold Allen responsible for all debt secured by the 
Property is required by the plain language of the Decree. Moreover, the Court of Appeals' 
construction of the Decree is the only one that gives effect to all provisions thereof without 
ignoring or adding any. That interpretation recognizes Ms. Satterfield's unlimited right to 
encumber the Property while she lived in Salt Lake City, acknowledges Allen's responsibility 
for all debts secured by the Property in the event of a reversion, and also gives effect to the 
language of the Decree providing that in the event of reversion, Allen is to sell the Property 
"and divide the proceeds equally with [Ms. Satterfield]." Were Allen to be responsible only 
for pre-divorce debt in the event of reversion as he argues, the Decree would have stated that 
after selling the Property, Allen must give Ms. Satterfield half of the sale proceeds, less any 
amount by which she had increased the debt secured by the Property since the divorce. Since 
the Court of Appeals interpreted the Decree correctly, to the extent Allen is entitled to the 
Property, he must accept responsibility for all debt secured by the Property on the date of 
reversion. 
III. IN THE EVENT THAT ALLEN IS ENTITLED TO THE PROPERTY, HE MUST 
PAY FOR HALL'S IMPROVEMENTS 
The Court of Appeals' holding that Allen must pay for Hall's improvements to the 
Property was also correct. While the Court of Appeals based its decision on the Occupying 
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Claimants Act, it could just as readily have held that Allen would be unjustly enriched by 
obtaining the benefit of Hall's improvements without paying for them. 
Each requirement for recovery under the Occupying Claimants Act is present in this 
case. Specifically, Hall made valuable improvements to the Property in good faith when he 
had color of title to the Property. The Occupying Claimants Act includes its own definition 
of "color of title," and resort to the common law definition, to the extent it differs, is 
unnecessary. Under the relevant definition, claimants have color of title to property if "[t]hey 
either 'occupied a tract of real estate . . . for the term of five years,' or they, or those under 
whom they claim, have made Valuable improvements' to real estate 'with the owner's 
knowledge or consent.'" Allen does not dispute the fact that Hall significantly improved the 
Property. Nor can Allen genuinely contest the fact that he, at least impliedly knew of or 
consented to Hall's making such improvements. Indeed, the trial court expressly found that 
Allen knew Hall was occupying the Property and must have known that, as the new owner, 
Hall would improve the Property. Hall therefore had color of title to the Property insofar as 
the Occupying Claimants Act is concerned. 
To the extent that Hall failed to properly allege the value of the Property and his 
improvements in his pleadings as Allen argues, that failure is of no consequence. Under 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "[w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if 
they had been raised in the pleadings." The parties resolved any question of the value of the 
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Property and Hall's improvements at trial. Indeed, the testimony at trial indicated the value 
of the unimproved Property and the value of Hall's improvements. Under Rule 15(b), 
therefore, Hall's pleadings are deemed to have raised the very issues Allen contends they did 
not. 
With respect to the final element of Hall's Occupying Claimants Act claim, Hall 
improved the Property in good faith because he genuinely believed that he owned the 
Property at the time. Whether Hall had constructive notice of the possibility that the Property 
might revert to Allen is irrelevant. This Court should thus affirm the Court of Appeals and 
remand the case to the trial court for a determination of the precise amount to which the 
Moores, as Hall's successors, are entitled. 
Even if Hall does not have a valid claim under the Occupying Claimants Act, the 
Moores are nonetheless entitled to recover the value of Hall's improvements to the Property 
in the event that this Court affirms the Court of Appeals' decision to award the Property to 
Allen. Allen would be unjustly enriched if he is allowed to not only recover the Property, 
but also to retain the benefit of Hall's improvements without paying for them. First, Allen 
has never disputed the fact that Hall spent approximately $52,000 to improve the Property, 
and inasmuch as Allen regained ownership of the Property in July 1999, he has obviously 
benefitted from Hall's expenditures. Second, Allen has known for years that Hall improved 
the Property. Finally, Allen's retention of Hall's improvements without paying for them 
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would amount to a windfall. It would thus be patently inequitable to award the Property to 
Allen without his paying for Hall's improvements. 
Consequently, in the event that Allen is deemed the owner of the Property, the Court 
should remand this case to the trial court for a determination of the amount the Moores are 
entitled to recover as Hall's successors under either the Occupying Claimants Act or as 
damages for unjust enrichment. 
ARGUMENTS 
The Court of Appeals erred by reversing the trial court's determination that Hall is 
entitled to the Property. To the extent the Court of Appeals was correct, however, and Allen 
is entitled to the Property, he is also responsible for all indebtedness secured by the Property. 
Furthermore, again assuming Allen is entitled to the Property, he is not entitled to the benefit 
of Hall's improvements to the Property without paying therefor. This Court should 
consequently reverse the Court of Appeals' decision quieting title to the Property in Allen, 
and instead award the Property to the Moores as successors-in-interest to Hall and 
Homecomings Financial. Should the Court affirm the Court of Appeals' decision to award 
the Property to Allen, however, the Court must avoid giving Allen an undeserved windfall 
by affirming the Court of Appeals' decision making Allen responsible for all indebtedness 
secured by the Property at the time ownership reverted to him, and by affirming the Court of 
Appeals' decision to require Allen to pay for Hall's improvements to the Property. 
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I. EQUITABLE DEFENSES MAY DEFEAT LEGAL CLAIMS AND THE 
COURT OF APPEALS' CONTRARY DECISION WAS ERRONEOUS 
The trial court correctly ruled that Hall (and therefore the Moores, as Hall's 
successors), not Allen, is entitled to the Property. The trial court's decision to quiet title to 
the Property in Hall was based on its assessment that it would be "unjust, inequitable and 
intolerable" to award the Property to Allen when, knowing that Hall had purchased the 
Property and would mortgage and improve it, Allen failed to notify Hall of the possibility 
that the Property might revert to him and failed to initiate a lawsuit to claim the Property for 
approximately two years. [R. 540-41]. Moreover, the trial court found "Allen's silence, 
delay and inactivity to be intentional and designed to enhance the value emd equity of the 
[Property]" to Hall's detriment. Id. Put another way, the trial court rejected Allen's claim 
to the Property on the basis of "laches, estoppel and unjust enrichment." [R. 541]. 
The Court of Appeals' erroneous decision to instead award the Property to Allen was 
based on its determination that the recorded deed by which Allen conveyed the Property to 
Ms. Satterfield gave Hall notice of the fact that he was purchasing the Property subject to a 
possibility of reverter. See 2005 UT App. 23, % 11 ("Hall's notice of Allen's interest destroys 
any equitable ground upon which the court could quiet title in Hall, as Hall cannot be said 
to have had any good faith belief that he was purchasing the property in fee simple."). 
Because Hall had notice of a possibility of reverter, the Court of Appeals reasoned, there was 
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no equitable basis upon which the trial court could award the Property to him.1 Id. The 
Court of Appeals was wrong. Equitable defenses such as laches, estoppel and unjust 
enrichment can apply to and defeat an action at law, such as one for the recovery of real 
property pursuant to a recorded deed. The Court of Appeals should therefore have affirmed 
the trial court. 
This Court has long recognized that equitable defenses may be asserted against legal 
claims in the courts of this state. See Marlowe Inv. Corp. v. Radmall, 485 P.2d 1402, 1404 
n.3 (Utah 1971); Columbia Trust Co. v. Anglurn, 225 P. 1089,1093 (Utah 1924). While this 
principle was rooted in the Constitution of Utah for many years, see Utah Const, art. VIII, 
§19 (repealed 1984), it lives on in Rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
provides simply that "[t]here shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action.'" Utah 
R. Civ. P. 2; see also Maksym v. Loesch, 937 F.2d 1237, 1248 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Not only is 
there a long tradition of applying equitable defenses in cases at law . . . but with the merger 
of law and equity (Fed. R. Civ. P. 2) there is no longer a good reason to distinguish between 
the legal and equitable character of defenses"). Notwithstanding the widespread abolition 
of historical distinctions between courts of law and equity, some states without separate 
courts continue to hold equitable defenses inapplicable to legal actions. See 21A Am. Jur. 
2d Equity § 150(1996). The trend, however - and Utah seems to have been in the vanguard 
- is increasingly to permit the application of traditionally equitable defenses to actions at law. 
lThe Court of Appeals identified absolutely no authority for this conclusion. 
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Id- see also Loesch, 937 F.2d at 1247-48 (noting that "[1]aches is an equitable doctrine but 
one increasingly applied in cases at law"); Department of Banking & Finance v. Wilken, 352 
N.W.2d 145, 149 (Neb. 1984) ("The common-law rule is that equitable defenses cannot be 
used to defeat an action at law based upon contract; however, we have not accepted that 
position, but, on the contrary, we have held that any defense, whether it be legal or equitable, 
may be set up in any case."); Grigg v. Robinson Furniture Co., 260 N.W.2d 898,903 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1977) ("At least since 1963, equitable and legal claims may be joined in a common 
complaint and equitable defenses can defeat legal claims."); Kerin v. Udolf, 334 A.2d 434, 
437 (Conn. 1973) ("It is also well settled that equitable defenses or claims may be raised in 
an action at law."). 
Given this Court's long-standing approval of the assertion of equitable defenses to 
legal claims, and the general trend in that direction, the Court of Appeals erred by holding 
that Hall's equitable defenses of laches, estoppel and unjust enrichment could not overcome 
Allen's legal claim to the Property. In more practical terms, the Court of Appeals' decision 
placed a judicial seal of approval on conduct the trial court found to be "unjust, inequitable 
and intolerable." Specifically, the Court of Appeals sanctioned Allen's intentional failure 
to disclose the possibility that the Property might revert to him for the purpose of enhancing 
the Property's value at Hall's expense and for Allen's benefit. [R. 540-41]. The Court 
should therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the trial court -
which was best suited to evaluate Allen's behavior and motives - to quiet title to the Property 
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in Hall as a result of Allen's "unjust, inequitable and intolerable" conduct.2 See 21A Am. 
Jur. 2d Equity § 167 (1996) ("Courts do not look favorably upon plaintiffs who, while 
knowing or having notice of the facts that provide a basis for their claim, stand mute or silent 
and do not complain or protest."). 
IL IN THE EVENT THAT ALLEN IS ENTITLED TO THE PROPERTY, HE IS 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL DEBT SECURED THEREBY AS OF THE TIME 
THE PROPERTY REVERTED TO HIM 
The Court of Appeals correctly determined that, to the extent the Property reverted to 
Allen when Ms. Satterfield moved out of Salt Lake City, Allen took title to the Property 
subject to all indebtedness secured by the Property at that time. The Court of Appeals' 
decision rested upon the fact that the Decree expressly provided that upon the Property's 
reversion to him, Allen would "be responsible for all indebtedness thereon until the house 
is sold." [R. 9]. The Court of Appeals therefore held that "[t]his clear language indicates 
that Allen takes the [P]roperty subject to any debt existing at the time of the reversion " 
See 2005 UT App. 23, f 12. Any other decision would have ignored the language of the 
Decree and given Allen an unjustified windfall. 
2Allen suggests that if the Court affirms the Court of Appeals, the case should be 
remanded so that the trial court may consider his claim that Hall was unjustly enriched by 
occupying the Property after Ms. Satterfield moved out of Salt Lake City. See Brief of 
Petitioner, at pp. 25-26. Remand for this purpose would be unnecessary. First, Allen's own 
inequitable conduct, as found by the trial court, precludes his recovery on any equitable 
theory. See Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102,107 (Utah 1984) ("[H]e who seeks equity must 
do equity."). Second, Hall not only paid for his use of the Property, but he made significant 
improvements to the Property. It would consequently be impossible for Allen to ever show 
that Hall was unjustly enriched. 
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Preliminarily, Allen's contention that the Moores (as successors to Hall and 
Homecomings Financial's interests in the Property) lack standing to enforce the Decree is 
wrong. See Brief of Petitioner, at pp. 24-25. As Allen acknowledges, the existence of 
contractual third-party beneficiary status turns on the intent of the parties to create rights in 
the third-party. See id. (quoting Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 536 (Utah 
1993)); see also Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Utah 1982) 
("Where it appears from the promise or the contracting situation that the parties intended that 
a third party receive a benefit, then the third party may enforce his rights in the courts "). 
Allen and Ms. Satterfield's intention to benefit Hall and Homecomings Financial could 
hardly be clearer. Indeed, as both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held, the Decree 
orders Allen to repay any debt secured by the Property as of the date of reversion. [R. 9]. 
Since it was practically certain at the time the Decree was entered that a debt to a third-party 
would be secured by the Property in the event of reversion, Allen and Ms. Satterfield must 
have intended to benefit such third-party mortgagee. The Moores, as Homecomings 
Financial's successor, are therefore properly considered third-party beneficiaries of the 
Decree and they have standing to enforce the debt repayment requirement thereof. 
A. Neither of Allen's Challenges to the Court of Appeals' Decision 
Withstands Scrutiny. 
Allen's challenge to the Court of Appeals' decision with respect to his obligation to 
pay the debt secured by the Property has two prongs. Allen first offers a "Real property 
Analysis." According to Allen, Ms. Satterfield could only convey to Hall whatever interest 
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she had in the Property. Once Hall's interest in the Property terminated when Ms. Satterfield 
left Salt Lake City, so Allen's argument goes, both Hall and Homecomings Financial lost 
their rights to "satisfy their claims against the Property . . . ." Brief of Petitioner, at p. 18. 
The inescapable flaw in Allen's argument is that it totally ignores the express 
language of the Decree. Again, the Decree states that upon Ms. Satterfield's removal from 
Salt Lake City, Allen would "be responsible for all indebtedness [secured by the Property] 
until the house is sold." [R. 9]. Allen, Ms. Satterfield and the Third Judicial District Court, 
which rendered the Decree, clearly contemplated and agreed upon Allen's liability for any 
debt secured by the Property. Moreover, Allen knew that Ms. Satterfield encumbered the 
Property with additional debt following entry of the Decree. [R. 533-34]. Indeed, he 
acquiesced in her doing so, and actively facilitated the process on at least one occasion. [R. 
534]. Allen's doing so is totally inconsistent with his now disclaiming responsibility for any 
post-Decree debt. 
Had Allen really contemplated regaining title to the Property free and clear of all debt, 
as he now claims he did, he would not and should not have agreed to "be responsible for all 
indebtedness [secured by the Property] until the house is sold." Thus, whether Hall or 
Homecomings Financial retained any legal interest in the Property after it reverted to Allen, 
if indeed it did, is immaterial. Allen was ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction to "be 
responsible for all indebtedness [secured by the Property]." He is not at liberty to thumb his 
nose at this command and simply disregard it. 
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The second prong of Allen's argument, which in a sense is the inverse of the first, is 
also untenable. Rather than ignoring the Decree altogether, as the first prong does, the 
second "Contract Analysis" prong of Allen's argument depends on judicial augmentation of 
the Decree with language that neither the parties nor the rendering court actually included. 
Allen argues that he cannot be responsible for any debt secured by the Property since the date 
of his divorce because the Decree gave Ms. Satterfield the right to encumber only her 50 
percent interest in the Property. Put another way, Allen claims that "[t]he Decree of Divorce 
did not give Ms. Satterfield any rights to deal with . . . Allen's one-half of the Property." 
Brief of Petitioner, at p. 22. 
Nowhere does the Decree purport to give Allen a one-half interesl in the Property. 
On the contrary, the Decree awarded the Property to Ms. Satterfield as "her sole and separate 
property." [R. 9]. While there was a possibility that the Property may revert to Allen at some 
future time, the Decree placed absolutely no restriction on Ms. Satterfield's use of the 
Property so long as she remained in Salt Lake City. Consequently, so long as the Property 
was hers, Ms. Satterfield was free to encumber any or all of the Property as she alone saw 
fit. The Decree simply does not contain the restriction Allen argues it does. 
In the total absence of any limit on Ms. Satterfield's right to encumber the Property 
with debt, Allen's contention that he cannot be responsible for any post-divorce debt secured 
by the Property is eviscerated by the plain language of the Decree. Once more, the Decree 
made Allen "responsible for all indebtedness [secured by the Property]." To the extent the 
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Property reverted to him, Allen must therefore repay all debt secured by the Property as of 
the time of reversion. 
B. The Court of Appeals Correctly Determined that Allen is 
Responsible for All Debt Secured by the Property at the Time of 
Reversion. 
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly determined that, if Allen were 
entitled to the Property, he would take it "subject to any debt existing at the time of the 
reversion." 2005 UT App. 23, f 12; R. 538. Courts are obliged to interpret contracts, 
including divorce decrees, as a whole and to give effect to all provisions thereof. See Nielsen 
v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 1993). The Court of Appeals1 decision does so with 
respect to the Decree. 
First, the Court of Appeals' decision recognizes Ms. Satterfield's unlimited right to 
encumber the Property while she lived in Salt Lake City. Second, the decision acknowledges 
Allen's responsibility for all debts secured by the Property in the event of a reversion. 
Indeed, the Court of Appeals opined that the "clear language" of the Decree expressly made 
Allen "'responsible for all indebtedness [secured by the Property] until the house is sold.'" 
2005 UT App. 23, f 12 (quoting the Decree).3 Finally, the Court of Appeals' decision also 
3
 When questioned about the language of the Decree at trial, Allen testified as follows: 
Q. Okay, you don't put anything in the decree providing that the refinance can't 
occur; you don't put anything in the decree saying it can't be sold, but yet you 
do put in there all indebtedness. So there could be additional indebtedness 
against the property? 
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gives effect to the language of the Decree providing that in the event of reversion, Allen is 
to sell the Property "and divide the proceeds equally with [Ms. Satterfield]." [R. 9]. If Allen 
were only to be responsible for pre-divorce debt in the event of reversion, the Decree would 
have instead stated that after selling the Property, Allen must give Ms. Satterfield half of the 
sale proceeds, less any amount by which she had increased the debt secured by the Property 
since the divorce. The Court of Appeals' decision takes each of these elements of the Decree 
into account, and ignores none. The interpretation Allen urges does not. To the extent Allen 
is entitled to the Property, therefore, he must accept responsibility for all debt secured by the 
Property on the date of reversion. 
III. IN THE EVENT THAT ALLEN IS ENTITLED TO THE PROPERTY, HE 
MUST PAY FOR HALL'S IMPROVEMENTS 
The Court of Appeals' holding that Allen must pay for Hall's improvements to the 
Property was correct. Although the Court of Appeals based its decision on the Occupying 
Claimants Act, it could just as easily have held that Allen would be unjustly enriched by 
obtaining the benefit of Hall's improvements without paying for them. This Court therefore 
A. Well, if somebody were willing to take that chance on the reversionary 
interest, I presume so. 
Q. But it does say that you're responsible for it, doesn't it? 
A. Correct. 
Transcript of Bench Trial, at p. 71. 
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can and should affirm the Court of Appeals determination that, to the extent he is entitled to 
the Property, Allen must pay for Hall's improvements. 
A. The Occupying Claimants Act Requires that Allen Pay for Hall's 
Improvements to the Property. 
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly determined that Hall made 
valuable improvements to the Property in good faith when he had color of title to the 
Property. 2005 UT App. 23, f 13. The Court of Appeals therefore ruled that, in accordance 
with the Occupying Claimants Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1, etseq., Allen must reimburse 
Hall for such improvements and remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of 
the proper amount. Allen assails the Court of Appeals' holding with respect to each of the 
three requirements for recovery under the Occupying Claimants Act. He claims that Hall 
held legal title to the Property, but did not occupy the Property under color of title as required 
by the statute. See Brief of Petitioner, at p. 12. Next, Allen contends that Hall's recovery 
(which should flow to the Moores as Hall's successor) is precluded by his failure to plead 
both the value of the Property exclusive of the improvements made, and the value of the 
improvements themselves. See id., at p. 13. Finally, Allen appears to believe that Hall could 
not have improved the Property in good faith because he had constructive notice of the 
possibility that the Property may revert to Allen. See id,, at p. 14. 
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i. Hall Improved the Property While Occupying It Under Color of 
Title. 
Allen challenges the Court of Appeals' determination that Hall occupied the Property 
under color of title on the basis of the common law definition of "color of title." See Brief 
of Petitioner, at p. 12. This is the wrong basis. The Occupying Claimants Act includes its 
own definition of "color of title," and Hall occupied the Property under color of title 
according to that definition. In any event, as the Court of Appeals noted, Allen conceded on 
appeal that Hall had color of title to the Property. See 2005 UT App. 23, \ 13. 
According to the Occupying Claimants Act, 
Any person has color of title who has occupied a tract of real estate by himself, 
or by those under whom he claims, for the term of five years, or who has 
occupied it for less time, if he, or those under whom he claims, have at any 
time during the occupancy with the knowledge or consent, express or implied, 
of the real owner made any valuable improvements on the real estate . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-4(2)(a). Under this definition, which is the only relevant definition 
for purposes of this case, claimants have color of title to property if "[t]hey either 'occupied 
a tract of real estate . . . for the term of five years,' or they, or those under whom they claim, 
have made Valuable improvements' to real estate 'with the owner's knowledge or consent."' 
Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234,1241 (Utah 1998) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-4). Allen 
does not dispute the fact that Hall significantly improved the Property. Nor can Allen 
genuinely contest the fact that he, at least impliedly knew of or consented to Hall's making 
such improvements. Indeed, the trial court expressly found that Allen forcibly entered the 
Property within two days of Hall's occupying it and was confronted by Hall. [R. 535]. Allen 
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indicated at that time that he was there because he had become aware that the Property had 
been sold and he wanted to retrieve certain personal belongings. Id. Allen therefore knew 
that Hall was occupying the Property and must have known that, as the new owner, Hall 
would improve the Property. Hall therefore had color of title to the Property insofar as the 
Occupying Claimants Act is concerned, and Allen's assertion to the contrary is wrong. 
ii. Hall Made Valuable Improvements to the Property. 
Allen contends that Hall's claim under the Occupying Claimants Act fails because 
Hall neglected to plead either the value of the Property exclusive of the improvements made, 
or the value of the improvements themselves. See Brief of Petitioner, at p. 13. While Allen's 
contention may be correct, it is immaterial. This is so because under Rule 15 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, "[wjhen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or 
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised 
in the pleadings." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b). In this case, the parties indisputably resolved any 
question of the value of the Property and Hall's improvements at trial. See Transcript of 
Bench Trial, at pp. 89-95. Indeed, testimony elicited without objection at trial indicated that 
the Property was worth approximately $147,000 at the time Hall purchased it, and that Hall 
spent approximately $52,000 on improvements. See id. Under Rule 15(b), therefore, Hall's 
pleadings are deemed to have raised the very issues Allen contends they did not. 
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iii. Hall Improved the Property in Good Faith. 
Allen's final argument against Hall's recovery under the Occupying Claimants Act 
is that Hall could not have improved the Property in good faith because Hall had constructive 
notice of the possibility that the Property might revert to Allen. See Brief of Petitioner, at p. 
14. This Court has already rejected just such an argument. See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 
1234(Utah 1998) (good faith belief in ownership of "life interest" satisfies good faith 
requirement of Occupying Claimants Act). The Court should reject it once again and affirm 
the Court of Appeals. 
For purposes of the Occupying Claimants Act, good faith means "a reasonable and 
honest belief of ownership." Ute-Cal Land Dev. Corp. v. Sather, 645 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah 
1982). Given that he purchased the Property from Ms. Satterfield pursuant to a quit-claim 
deed by assuming her loans totaling approximately $ 139,000, and by paying her $7,000, Hall 
clearly had a basis for reasonably and honestly believing that he owned the Property. [R. 
534]. Indeed, the trial court held that Hall had a good faith belief in his ownership, and Allen 
himself affirmatively contends that Hall owned the Property. See Brief of Petitioner, at p. 12 
("Hall occupied the Property pursuant to his actual legal title to the Property "); R. 542. 
Whether Hall had notice of any possibility of reverter is therefore of no moment. 
As the Court of Appeals correctly held, Hall does qualify for reimbursement under the 
Occupying Claimants Act. Hall made tens of thousands of dollars of improvements to the 
Property believing in good faith that he owned it. Moreover, he did so under color of title 
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as that term is defined by the Occupying Claimants Act. This Court should thus affirm the 
Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for a determination of the precise 
amount to which the Moores, as Hall's successors, are entitled. 
B. Allen Would be Unjustly Enriched if Permitted to Retain the Benefit of 
Hall's Improvements Without Paying For Them. 
Even if Hall does not have a valid claim against Allen under the Occupying Claimants 
Act, the Moores are nonetheless entitled to recover the value of Hall's improvements to the 
Property in the event that this Court affirms the Court of Appeals' decision to award the 
Property to Allen. While neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals had cause to address 
unjust enrichment, Hall asserted a claim for relief under such a theory in his counterclaim 
against Allen. [R. 110-11]. It is therefore proper for this Court to rule that Allen must pay 
unjust enrichment damages to the Moores if he is awarded the Property. See Bailey v. 
Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f 10, 52 P.3d 1158 (noting that an appellate court may affirm the 
judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record). 
In order to prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, three elements must be 
met. First, there must be a benefit conferred on one person by another. 
Second, the conferee must appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit. 
Finally, there must be "the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the 
benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to 
retain the benefit without payment of its value." 
Desert MiriaK Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, % 13, 12 P.3d 580. Each of these 
elements is present in this case. First, Allen has never disputed the fact that Hall spent 
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approximately $52,000 to improve the Property. Inasmuch as Allen regained ownership of 
the Property in July 1999, he has obviously benefitted from Hall's expenditures. Second, 
Allen has known for years that Hall improved the Property. Indeed, Hall's counterclaim in 
the early stages of this litigation gave notice of his improvements. [R. 110-11]. Finally, 
Allen's retention of Hall's improvements without paying for them would amount to a 
windfall. It would thus be patently inequitable to award the Property to Allen without his 
paying for Hall's improvements. 
In light of the foregoing, in the event that Allen is deemed the owner of the Property, 
the Court should remand this case to the trial court for a determination of the amount the 
Moores are entitled to recover as Hall's successors under either the Occupying Claimants Act 
or as damages for unjust enrichment. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Moores respectfully request that this Court 
reverse the Court of Appeals' decision to quiet title to the Property in Allen. Title to the 
Property should instead be quieted in the Moores. In the event the Court affirms the Court 
of Appeals' decision to award the Property to Allen, the Court should also affirm the Court 
of Appeals' determination that Allen is responsible for all indebtedness secured by the 
Property as of July 1999, and that Allen must pay for Hall's improvements to the Property. 
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DATED this j ^ day of November, 2005. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C. 
By:. 
Ronald Gf. Russell 
MattheW J. Ball 
Attorneys for Intervenors Chad R. Moore 
& Melanie S. Moore 
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CHAD R. MOORli 
10159 SOUTH FLANDERS ROAD 
SANDY. UT S4Q92 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
BANK ONE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE 
organized and existing under the laws of the United States of America, grantor, hereby 
conveys and warrants against all claiming by, through or under it to 
CHAD R. MOORE A N D MELA NIK S. MOORE, HUSBAND AND WIEE 
AS JOINT TENANTS 
AS GRANTEE 
tor the sum of TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABU? 
CONSIDERATION the following described tract of land in SALT LAKE County, State 
ofUtah. 
I ,OT 3, WHITE CITY NO. 41, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT 
THEREOF ON FILE A N D OF RECORD IN THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
RECORDER'S OFFICE, 
T A X ID" # 28-09-381-012 
Subject to **Kcs foi thus y * * r 2003 and thereafter, cavemen**, covenants, conditions and tesfrttlfoas *nd 
x t&ltis of way appisaTing o f iccorrf 
Dated this 28TU day o f JULY 2004. 
BANK ONE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION , AS 
TRUSTEE 
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C O L O R A T I O N , attorney in fact 
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STATE OF California ) 
County of San Diego ) 
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was proven to me on the oasis of satisfactory evidence, and who> being by me duly sworn 
(or affirmed) did acknowledge to rne that he/*hc executed the foregoing instrument for Its 
slated purpose on behalf of RES U>Er4TIAL FUNDING CORPORATION, attorney m 
fact for JPMOROAN CHASE BANK, and acknowledged to mc that said corporation * 
executed the same 
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